We introduce two novel frameworks for choice under complete uncertainty. These frameworks employ intervals to represent uncertain utility attaching to outcomes. In the first framework, utility intervals arising from one act with multiple possible outcomes are aggregated via a set-based approach. In the second framework the aggregation of utility intervals employs multisets. On the aggregated utility intervals, we then introduce min-max decision rules and lexicographic refinements thereof. The main technical results are axiomatic characterizations of these min-max decision rules and these refinements. We also briefly touch on the independence of introduced axioms. Furthermore, we show that such characterizations give rise to novel axiomatic characterizations of the well-known min-max decision rule mnx in the classical framework of choice under complete uncertainty.
Introduction
Choice under complete uncertainty refers to a situation in which a choice has to be made among a set of known acts where the possible outcomes of each act are known, but the Decision Maker (DM) does not have any information on the (relative) probabilities of the possible outcomes (uncertainty about occurrence of events). Furthermore, the possible outcomes are totally ordered by the DM's ordinal preference relation, which allows comparisons, whether one outcome is preferred to another outcome. The final ingredient is that the DM's preferences do not allow a cardinal assessment of how much more an outcome is appreciated than another outcome (uncertainty about utility of outcomes), cf. [7, Chapter 3] .
One important tool for the analysis of choice under complete uncertainty are investigations, in particular axiomatic characterizations, of preference relations [22] . Preference relations are here used for comparing utilities of possible outcomes, thus enabling a comparison of preferences over acts. One particular such preference relation is the min-max decision rule mnx , introduced in [15] , which represents a risk-averse DM of bounded rationality. The relation mnx as well as its lexicographic refinement L mnx have attracted considerable interest [3, 4, 7, 9, 29] .
In choice under complete uncertainty approaches the preference relations used to represent the DM's preference structure over the set of outcomes are most often linear orders. Such a representation is appropriate, for instance, if the DM can assign every possible outcome a single number reflecting an ordinal utility the outcome will yield. Staying true to the theme of complete uncertainty we here investigate a situation, in which such a representation is not appropriate. We will consider a DM which can only imprecisely specify the ordinal utilities attaching to outcomes.
We will here develop two frameworks where the utility obtained from a possible outcome is best represented as an interval in some connected totally ordered space X. The two frameworks we introduce differ from each other in the way they aggregate utilities from different outcomes resulting from the same act. In these frameworks we study min-max decision rules mnx , respectively. The refinements C mnx , L 2mnx enable us to distinguish between more acts, i.e., to break ties of mnx respectively 2mnx .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First we give some examples motivating our approach, then we put our work into a wider context by discussing related work. In the first technical part of the paper we introduce a set-based framework for interval-valued utilities in which the objects of choice are sets of utilities formed by finite unions of intervals, which can be visualized as utility intervals that may have gaps in them. In the second part of the paper, we introduce a vector-or multi-set-based framework in which the objects of choice are finite multi-sets of intervals whose members are considered as distinct objects even if they overlap. In both parts we shall investigate min-max decision rules and lexicographic refinements. Finally we conclude. In Appendix A and Appendix B we show how some of the axioms which we introduced for the multi-valued utility framework, can be adapted to yield an axiomatic characterization of the mnx relation. Furthermore, we improve upon Arlegi's axiomatic characterization of mnx given in [4] .
Motivating Examples
Example 1: At a fair you have the opportunity to buy a ticket for one of three raffles, each of which is a lottery that offers a chance of winning one out of a number of plush toys. The toys that may be won in each raffle are on display, but the chances of winning a given toy in a given raffle are not exactly known. You plan to take the toy home and give it to your nephew, if you did purchase a winning ticket. So the utility you obtain from a winning a certain toy (possible outcome) depends on the appreciation of a third person (your nephew).
Example 2: Consider a student deciding when to e-mail in a summer break take-home assignment. If the student sends the assignment off right away, then the resulting grade may either be a "B" or a "C". If the student works two further weeks on it and then sends it off, the grade may possibly improve to an "A". Given that a better grade is likely to lead to better (paying) job offers she prefers a better grade to a worse grade.
Example 3: A student in the process of graduating from university with a business degree is looking for a permanent job. Several companies in different cities hold assessment tests on the same day. A company typically has several different vacancies in different branches at the same time. The salary for such a job may contain a variable part, which depends on the performance of the employee as well as the whole company. Depending on the student's performance she is invited to interview for a subset of the available positions.
The common theme of these examples is that a DM may be reluctant to assign a single number to each outcome representing her utility. More-over, the DM might not be willing to specify a single probability function expressing her beliefs in obtaining a certain utility from an outcome. The DM may feel more comfortable assigning each outcome a range of utilities it may possibly yield without making any assertion concerning the likelihood of the outcomes yielding these utilities. Thus, the DM's preferences over acts (with in general more than one possible outcome) are best be represented by preferences over sets of intervals of utility.
Related Work

Choice under Complete Uncertainty
Choice under complete uncertainty can be understood as subfield of ranking sets of objects [6, 7, 21, 27, 34, 42] . The latter is the study of how to extend preferences defined over objects to preferences over sets of such objects. The former interprets these objects as possible outcomes and acts as sets of possible outcomes. A DM's relative preference for one act over another can thus be understood as relative preference of one set of possible outcomes over another such set. A good albeit slightly outdated overview of this field can be found in [7, Section 3] .
Bossert & Slinko [16] studied uncertainty aversion in set-based models of choice under complete uncertainty. They provided a complete ranking of certain decision rules according to relative degree of uncertainty aversion. Gravel et al. [29] took a slightly different approach, characterizing decision rules under complete uncertainty via expected utility. Arlegi [3] showed how some well-known decision rules under complete uncertainty can be reinterpreted in procedural terms. From such a perspective the DM evaluates possible acts by comparing certain focal elements in the set of possible outcomes of these acts, losing sight or even completely ignoring all non-focal elements. Decision models using only a limited amount of information are of particular interest in psychology [28] . Ben Larbi et al. investigated strategies of agents playing multiple outcomes games [8] . They thus demonstrated the relevance of choice under complete uncertainty to game theory.
Recall that in the framework of choice under complete uncertainty it is assumed that the DM knows all possible outcomes resulting from each act. If we instead assume that the DM cannot envision the possible outcomes of acts, then choices are said to be taken under complete ignorance. Ben Larbi et al. [9] axiomatically investigated a min-max decision rule under complete ignorance. They then compare their results to those of [4] and [15] .
Uncertain Utility
Decision making with acts of known but uncertain outcomes, in which the DM cannot specify the subjective expected utility of an outcome, have featured prominently in the literature. We concentrate here only on the aspects of such investigations that are more relevant to us, see [11, 12] for classical overviews. Building on the work of Kreps [38] , Olszewski and Ahn studied choices between sets of lotteries in [1, 40] . Ahn [1] presented a theory of objective ambiguity without a state space. Olszewski [40] considered a framework where Nature chooses a particular lottery from the selected set of lotteries. Vierø [44] considered acts which map to sets of lotteries and gave an axiomatic characterization of certain decision rules. Jaffray & Jeleva [32] investigated acts that are only partially analyzable.
A further approach describes uncertain utility by interval probabilities, for which the axiomatic foundations were laid by Weichselberger [47] . Kozine & Utkin [37] used these probabilities to study Markov chains. For a recent overview of the many applications of interval probabilities refer to Augustin & Coolen [5, Section 2] . Range based utilities, with or without interval probabilities [46] , have found their way into more practical applications. Such ranges have successfully been applied in (group) decision making and recommender systems, e.g. in [20, 30, 33, 35, 36, 43] and in the economics literature, exemplary we mention [2, 18] .
Interval Orders
The problem of ordering intervals is well-known and well-studied. The most important notion in this field is that of an interval order, cf. [23, 25] . An interval order I O on an ordered space (X, >) orders subsets of X such that for all Y, Z ⊂ X and Y I O Z it holds that the minimum of Y is greater than the maximum of Z, where the minimum and maximum are according to > . However, the focus of this research field is on the representability of interval orders by real-valued functions [13, 17, 19, 39] and not on axiomatic characterizations of preference relations as it is here.
Preference relations over intervals taking only endpoints into account are by design a rather simple class. Thus, preference orders over intervals taking also selected interior points into considerations have been developed. In [41] a general framework is developed for the comparisons of "n-point intervals". However, this framework only allows for comparisons of intervals having the same number of points.
The Min-Max Relation for Intervals
The Formal Framework
We now introduce our set-based approach; for discussions on the merits of the set-based approach see [7, 15, 42] . We let A be the set of acts, O be the set of possible outcomes and U be the possible utilities obtained from the o ∈ O. We here follow approaches in "choice under complete uncertainty" in which utilities are measured on an ordinal scale. The notion of "utility" used here is thus different from the classical notion of utility introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern. For a detailed introduction to choice under complete uncertainty motivating the set-up in detail we refer the reader to [7, Section 3] .
Denote by O a the set of possible outcomes for act a ∈ A, which we assume to be finite. A set O a containing more than one element is interpreted as an uncertain prospect where the DM does not have any information on the likelihood over the possible outcomes in O a . Now assume for a moment that the utility obtained from every possible outcome o ∈ O can be described by a single value u ∈ U. Furthermore, consider an act a ∈ A with multiple possible outcomes, where two of these outcomes, o, o ∈ O a say, yield the same utility u ∈ U. The DM thus knows that obtaining utility u from act a is possible. The presence of multiple outcomes yielding the same utility does not give the DM any further information concerning the question: "Which values u ∈ U may an act a ∈ A possibly yield?"
As it is customary in decision science, for the purpose of deciding how to act, we identify an act a ∈ A with the utility/utilities it may yield. Thus, if ϕ maps every o ∈ O to the utility DM obtains from it, we can represent an act a ∈ A by the set of utilities o∈Oa ϕ(o) ⊆ U.
For a DM possessing information on the relative likelihoods of outcomes for a given act, the question of which outcome may yield which utility would surely be relevant. However, we here have a situation where this is not the case. Plausibly, we can thus represent an act in such a situation by the u ∈ U it may possibly yield.
Let us now backtrack and assume that the utility obtained from a possible outcome o ∈ O consists possibly of more than one u ∈ U. Following the reasoning above, we identify an act a ∈ A with o∈Oa ϕ(o) ⊆ U where now the ϕ(o) may contain more than value. If O a contains only one single element, then the act a does not have any uncertain outcomes. The utility obtained from such an act is deterministic, if and only if for the unique o a ∈ O a it holds that ϕ(o a ) consists of a unique u ∈ U.
Bossert et al. introduced mnx in [15] where they considered a finite set of outcomes. There, the DM was assumed to have a reflexive, transitive and complete binary preferences on O, thus the DM's preferences are given by an injective function f : O → N. In their framework O and U can thus be understood as finite subsets of N.
We here identify U with R and assume that the utility obtained from an o ∈ O a is represented by a compact interval in R. 2 The complete linear order on R will simply be denoted by > . Thus, for all a ∈ A the set o∈Oa ϕ(o) ⊂ R consists of finitely many connected components of R. Hence, acts a ∈ A can be evaluated by comparing finite unions of compact intervals. For example, if
2 Let us be absolutely clear here. We could in general assume that U is some infinite connected topological space with a complete linear order. Nothing hinges on the particular space, we will here simply use R. Since the preference relations we consider are invariant under order preserving transformations of the underlying space; here R; the canonical structure on R only carries meaning here in as far as it allows ordinal comparisons. 
Intervals
A set of the form [s, t] := {r ∈ R|s ≤ r ≤ t} is an interval in R. The degenerate interval [s, s], which consists of a single number, will be denoted merely by [s] to simplify notation. We will not consider the empty set to be an interval. Let IN T be the set of intervals and let I be the set of all finite unions of intervals, i.e.
We define the size of a J ∈ I as the number of connected components it possesses as a subset of R, which will be denoted by #J. For J ∈ I let j, j ∈ R denote, respectively, the minimum and maximum of J with respect to the standard order > on R. Let be an ordering over I, i.e. it is a reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation. This ordering is interpreted as the DM's preference structure over the uncertain outcomes, which we want to investigate. Let = and ≈ denote, respectively, the asymmetric and symmetric parts of .
Reflexivity and transitivity of preferences are such widely -though by no means universally -accepted assumptions in decision science that we shall not dwell on them here. The completeness assumption is more contentious. Note that all we will assume here is that whenever the DM is presented with two acts and their possible outcomes, the DM can decide whether the former act is at least of equal preference as the latter act. The DM is allowed to conclude that both acts are of equal preference. For example, the simple decision rule to avoid worst cases gives rise to a preference order P with a plethora of ties. Note that we do not require the DM to be able to efficiently communicate the complete preference relation P nor do we require that P is fully open to introspection. In light of these comments the assumption of completeness appears plausible.
Axioms and Preference Relations for Intervals
We now introduce a first set of axioms. With the exception of the substitution axiom, all other axioms have already appeared in the standard choice under uncertainty framework (in non-interval form) in [4] and [15] .
Interval Simple Monotonicity (ISM): For all r, s ∈ R such that r > s we 
Interval Monotone Consistency (IMC): For all H, J ∈ I with H J we have H ∪ J J. Interval Robustness (IROB): For all H, J ∈ I with H J we have H H∪J.
The dominance and monotonicity axioms formalize the idea that better outcomes are strongly preferred. ISUA and ISUP fix the DM's attitude towards uncertain utilities.
In ISUB int denotes the interior of the interval [s, r] ⊂ R in the standard topology on R, i.e. int([s, r]) = {t ∈ R|s < t < r}. If s = r, then the interior of the interval [s, r] is empty. Roughly speaking, the axioms says that removing some connected component [s 1 , r 1 ] from J and replacing it by an interval some other interval [s 2 , r 2 ], which is not already in J and such that r 1 < s 2 , yields a union of intervals J which is strictly preferred to J or of equal preference to J.
Note that ISUB is in general stronger than IWSUB. Furthermore, IWSUB implies for
We now define the min-max relation ( mnx ) and the max-min relation ( mxn ) on I × I. The strict parts are defined on pairs H, J ∈ I as follows
Under this min-max relation two acts are compared primarily by their worst possible outcome. If the worst possible outcome of an act is preferred to the worst possible outcome of another act, then the former act is preferred. If the worst possible outcomes are of equal preference, then the DM does not necessarily consider both acts to be of equal preference. In such cases, ties are broken by comparing best possible outcomes. Only in the case of equal preference of worst possible outcomes and equal preference of best possible outcomes is there indifference between acts. For example in the situation depicted in Figure 1 a DM applying the min-max rule prefers a ticket from raffle 1 over a ticket from raffle 2. For both raffles the worst possible outcome is of the same utility while the best outcome for raffle 1 is preferable to the best outcome for raffle 2. Clearly, mnx and mxn are in a natural sense dual to each other in that max and min have swapped roles. So every true statement about mnx can be turned into true statement about mxn by an appropriate dualization and vice versa. For the remainder we will concentrate on mnx . We shall use ≈ mnx to denote the symmetric part of mnx ; so if H mnx J and J mnx H, then H ≈ mnx J.
mnx is uncertainty-averse, mxn is uncertainty-seeking. For a discussion of uncertainty-aversion and uncertainty-seeking in nonprobabilistic decision models refer to [14] .
A First Axiomatic Characterisation of the Min-Max Relation
Let We shall now see that the uncertainty aversion axiom together with the monotonicity axiom and the first dominance axiom are jointly strong enough to ensure that every preference relation in our sense (reflexive, transitive and complete) agrees with the min-max rule when comparing pairs M, N ∈ IN T. 
If intervals M, N are such that M ≈ mnx N, then M = N and by the reflexivity of we find M ≈ N. Next consider intervals M, N such that M = mnx N. There are four cases to consider: (i) m = m and n = n, (ii) m < m and n = n, (iii) m = m and n < n and (iv) m < m and n < n. If (iii) holds, then m = m > n. Since n < n we either have m = m ≥ n > n or n > m = m > n. In the former case ISM and transitivity imply [m] [n] = [n, n]. In the latter case an application of ISUA yields M = N. If (iv) and M = mnx N hold, then one of the following four conditions has to hold:
If (5) holds, then by ISM and transitivity of = we find [ 
If (6) holds, then by ISM and transitivity of = we obtain
If (7) holds, then ISM, ISUA and transitivity of = we have
In case of (8) we apply ISD1 to obtain M = N.
The second equivalence will not be proved here. The proof is either along the lines used above or the above mentioned dualization argument may be applied. In plain English this means that any holes in J are ignored by .
Let us now assume that J contains some holes, i. 
From the above lemma it follows that in the presence of ISM, ISD1 and ISUA we can replace IWSUB equivalently with Interval Weak Substitution (IWSUB ):
Hence, in the following axiomatic characterization of mnx in Corollary 3, the only axioms mentioning the order > are ISM, ISD1 and ISUA. Proof Consider the preference relation min defined for H, J ∈ I by H min J if and only if h ≥ j. This relations fails to satisfy ISM but does satisfy the other five axioms.
Lemma 6. IWSUB is independent of ISM, ISD1, ISD2, ISUA, IROB and IMC.
Proof We define a preference relation W that differs from mnx by breaking certain ties. Consider J, J ∈ I such that J ≈ mnx J . If J is of the form This last result shows, that ISM, ISD1, ISUA, IROB and IMC are not strong enough to characterize mnx . This is in contrast to the characterization of mnx in [4] which only requires SM, SD1, SUA, ROB and MC to hold.
Further Characterizations of the Min-Max Relation
Arlegi's proof in [4] contains an axiomatic characterization of the minmax relation that corrected an erroneous proof in [15] . To obtain this characterization three new axioms are required. It is however possible to achieve this characterization without introducing any new axioms. We merely have to slightly modify one of the axioms introduced in [15] , see Theorem 24 on page 31 for details. Interestingly, we can do a very similar proof in our interval framework. The axiom we need to introduce is a close relative of the Axiom of Independence. The prototype of this axiom was first introduced in [26] and later fruitfully applied, for instance in [34] .
Interval Independence (IIND): For all H, J ∈ I and all I ∈ IN T with I H J we have H ∪ I J ∪ I. Proof The proof is done by induction #J. For #J = 1, there is nothing to prove.
We shall show in Lemma 12 on page 19 that ISD2 follows from ISM and ISUA. We may thus apply this axiom here. If #J = 2, then let J =
For #J ≥ 3 we let J = I 1 ∪ . . . ∪ I #J where i l ≤ i l < i l+1 and I l ∈ IN T for all l. By the induction hypothesis and ISM we find
Applying IIND yields [j,
Addressing the other direction note that by ISM and the induction hypothesis we have
We now apply IIND to the first equation in (9) and obtain
where the last step is by the induction hypothesis.
Corollary 8.
satisfies IIND, IWSUB, ISM, ISD1 and ISUA, if and only if = mnx .
Proof First note that mnx satisfies these 5 axioms. On the other hand by Lemma 1 agrees with mnx on intervals. By Theorem 7 we have that for all J ∈ I that J ≈ [j, j] holds.
We now give one further characterization of mnx . The following simple property highlights the fact that a DM comparing outcomes only focuses on a subset of all available information, see [15, p. 302-303 ] for a discussion on focal elements in decision making. The second axiom relates the preferences of the union two intervals with an empty intersection to focal elements.
Interval Focal Property (IFP): For all H, J ∈ I such that H ≈ J we have For #J ≥ 4 note that we can always obtain J ∈ I from a union of G, H ∈ I with #G = 3, #H = #J − 1 and g = h = j and g = h = j. By the induction hypothesis we obtain G ≈ H. Applying IFP completes the proof.
Corollary 10.
satisfies II, IFP, ISM, ISD1 and ISUA, if and only if = mnx .
So, in the presence of ISM, ISD1 and ISUA we have that the following sets of axioms are equivalent:
The axiomatic characterizations of mnx proved in this section are collected together and displayed in Table 1 .
Corollary 3 Corollary 8 Corollary 10
Interval Simple Monotonicity 
Lexicographic Refinement
The min-max relation introduced by [15] is not fine enough to distinguish between any two acts. To refine this relation Bossert et al. introduced a lexicographic version, denoted by L mnx , which breaks ties by removing the worst and the best possible outcome and comparing the remainder via the min-max relation. This process is then iterated to eventually break all ties. We will here now define a lexicographic version of C mnx refining mnx .
5 The resulting refinement C mnx will not break all ties. There are two natural ways how to translate Bossert et al.'s approach to our interval framework. Firstly, for each act a ∈ A we could remove the best and the worst possible outcome. However, this straightforward plan would not be in the spirit of the set-based approach, which we are taking here. Recall, that we argued in Section 4.1 that it should be irrelevant how many possible outcomes may yield a particular utility value u. The lexicographic refinement would then depend on whether there is only one possible outcome yielding the lowest utility or if there are multiple such outcomes.
The second natural way is to remove the connected components which contain the lowest and the highest utility. Since this approach does not suffer from the flaw highlighted above we shall pursue it here.
The Lexicographic Min-Max Relation
C mnx Definition 11. Let J ∈ I with J = I 1 ∪ I 2 ∪ · · · ∪ I #J where I l = [r l , s l ] and s l < r l+1 for all l. Now put n J := #J/2, if #J is even and n J := (#J + 1)/2 if #J is odd. Let J 0 := J and let for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n J J t := J t−1 \ (I t ∪ I #J+1−t ) and finally we put n JG := min{n J , n G } for all J, G ∈ I. For all J, G ∈ I we now define
So C mnx refines mnx by breaking certain but not all ties. Suppose J ≈ mnx G, we then remove the C onnected C omponents containing the minimum and the maximum and compare the remaining sets via mnx . We do this until either a preferable set is eventually found or both J t and G t are empty. In this last case J ≈ C mnx G. If G, J ∈ I, with G ≈ mnx J, are either intervals or the union of two intervals, then after removing the connected components we are left with two empty sets. Then G 6 , r 3 ] with s 1 ≤ t 1 < t 6 ≤ r 3 we will remove all of K and be left with the empty set. According to the definition G = C mnx K holds. This may be motivated as follows: At first the DM compares the worst possible outcomes and the best possible outcomes. If they are of equal preference, the DM will use the not-yet compared intervals to make a decision. Eventually, there are only intervals for one act left. Then, the DM has some idea how she appreciates these outcomes. For the other act however, there is no more interval left and the DM may thus fear the very worst. Since we here consider a strongly risk-averse DM, a preference relation according to which some known (possible dire) consequences are strictly preferred to a state of limbo appears appropriate.
A Second Set of Axioms
We now introduce axioms to characterize C mnx . The first four are inspired by their counterparts in [15] . IUA is a variant of the previously introduced ISUA. IM is seemingly needed as we are dealing with intervals. 
Suppose that #J is even, we let h := #J/2. By (11) we have
Similarly as above using IM and (11) we obtain I h−2 ∪ I h+1 = I h−3 ∪ I h+2 . Using the transitivity of = yields I h−2 ∪I h−1 ∪I h ∪I h+1 = I h−3 ∪I h+2 . Applying IEP1 we obtain
Continuing this way we eventually obtain J ∪ N ∪ M = #J+1 l=0 I l = N ∪ M. Now suppose that #J is odd, we let 2g := #J + 1. By (11) we have I g−1 = I g−2 ∪ I g . By IEP1 we find
Again applying (11) gives I g−2 = I g−3 ∪I g+1 . By transitivity of = and repeated application of IM we obtain I g−2 ∪ I g = I g−3 ∪ I g+1 . Together with (12) this
Hence by IEP1 and (11) we find
We can now follow this procedure to eventually obtain J ∪ N ∪ M = N ∪ M. Let us now turn to the other more interesting direction of the proof. It is sufficient to show for all J, H ∈ I that
and
If J ≈ C mnx H, we know that there is a t such that J t = H t = ∅ and J t−1 = ∅ = H t−1 . Note that J t−1 and H t−1 each contain at most two connected components. Furthermore j t−1 = h t−1 and j t−1 = h t−1 have to hold. Hence by
Reading IEIND both ways yields J t−2 ≈ H t−2 . Repeated application of IEIND eventually yields J ≈ H. Now suppose that J = C mnx H. The proof proceeds by considering cases. Assuming (14) there are three possibilities:
If (15) 
Now assume (15) and case D hold. So either (j = h and j > h) or j > h. In the the first case we obtain using Lemma 13, II and ID1:
In the second case we use that J = [j] and proceed as in cases CX and CY.
In case of (16) we know that J t = mnx H t . We just showed that then J t = H t holds. Application of IEIND (possibly repeated) gives J = H.
In case of (17) we know that J t−1 is the union of at least three pairwise disjoint intervals and that
where j t−1 ≤ k, k > 0 and k + k ≤ j t−1 . In both cases we have J t−1 = [j t−1 , j t−1 ] ≈ H t−1 by Lemma 13 and II. Application of IEIND (possibly repeated) yields J = H. Although we used the axiom IM in Lemma 13 it is not required in the above characterization.
Utilities represented as Multi-Sets of Intervals
In our set-based approach the utility obtained from an act was taken to be the point-wise union of utilities obtained from all possible outcomes. We will now deviate from this approach and take the utility obtained from an act a ∈ A to be the union of intervals in R which represent the utility obtained from the o ∈ O a . For example, if an act a has two possible outcomes which yield respective intervals [0.5, We thus study preference relations on such sets of intervals. Observe that if two possible outcomes o, o of the same act a yield the same utility interval, then the multi-set of utility intervals representing the act a contains ϕ(o) more than once. Using the terminology of [7] this approach could be called vector-based, although we do not require the vectors we compare to be of the same dimension nor does the order of the components of the vectors matter. We hence call our approach multi-set based. With the sole exception of IDOUB all axioms we introduce in this section are direct translations of axioms in [15] into our framework and thus inherit the justification of their brethren. Again, we shall assume that the DM has a linear preference relation over single outcomes. This now amounts to a binary relation over IN T, which we denote by . Definition 15. Let V = {I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I n } with I l ∈ IN T be a finite multi-set of intervals; the I l are thus not all necessarily pairwise distinct. We let SI be the set of all such multi-sets of intervals. For V ∈ SI let #V denote the number of intervals comprising V.
Definition 16. For V ∈ SI let v be the interval I in V such that for all other J ∈ V we have J mnx I. Let v be the so defined maximum. Define the strict part of the min-max decision rule 2mnx on SI for V, W ∈ SI by V = 2mnx W if and only if [v = mnx w or (v = w and v = mnx w)] . (19) Recall that for I, J ∈ IN T we have I = J, if and only if I ≈ mnx J. We can thus reorder V = {I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I #V } to achieve that for all l we have I l+1 2mnx I l with I l ≈ 2mnx I l+1 , if and only if I l = I l+1 . For V = {I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I #V } ∈ SI and W = {J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J #W } ∈ SI the relation 2mnx is given by first comparing the worst interval in V to the worst interval in W via the minmax relation. If I 1 = mnx J 1 , then V = 2mnx W. If I 1 = J 1 , then I #V and J #W are compared via the min-max rule. In that case if I #V = mnx J #W , then V = 2mnx W. Thus, V ≈ mnx J holds, if and only if I 1 = J 1 and I #V = J #W .
In plain English, 2mnx compares worst possible outcomes by the minmax rule. If there is a tie, best possible outcomes are compared by the minmax rule. If there is a second tie, then V ≈ 2mnx W. The double application of the min-max rule inspired the name 2mnx . Likewise, the number "2" in the following axioms indicates that they are closely related to their cousins in the set-based interval approach.
For the example in Figure 2 , a DM applying 2mnx would prefer a ticket of raffle 2 over a ticket of raffle 1. Both tickets have the same worst possible outcome, however for the best possible outcomes according to the min-max rule (winning a "bear" or a "lion") the outcome "lion" is preferred to the outcome "bear" according to the min-max rule. Recall that a DM applying mnx prefers a ticket of raffle 1.
Interval Cautious Substitution (ICSUB): Let V ∈ SI, I, J ∈ IN T be such that I, J / ∈ V and J I, then J ∪ V V ∪ I.
The axiom IDOUB implies that multiple outcomes from the same act which yield the exact same utility interval are treated as if there was only one such outcome. Accepting this axioms is appropriate in case the DM is only interested in which utility intervals I ∈ IN T an act a ∈ A may possibly yield. 
If (20) holds, then by 2ISM
If (22) L 2mnx is defined as a refinement of 2mnx . Suppose V, W ∈ SI are such that V ≈ 2mnx W and V = W. Then we remove the worst and the best element of V and of W, thus we obtain V and W ; where worst and best are here according to = mnx . We then compare the
W , then we again remove the worst and best elements and continue in this manner.
Since we assumed that V = W we eventually obtain either V = . We now mimic the proof of Lemma 2 on page 303 in [15] to extend the agreement to SI 2 .
Completely analogously to Lemma 4 on page 308 in [15] we will obtain the next lemma. Before that we need to introduce one further axiom. 
To complete the axiomatic characterization we need to introduce a few more axioms. Proof First note that L 2mnx satisfies all these axioms. For the other direction note that we already proved that agrees with L 2mnx on SI 2 . The rest of the proof is a simple adaptation of the proof of Theorem 5 on page 309 in [15] .
Comparing the characterization of L 2mnx to that of L mnx (see Theorem 5 in [15] ) we note that SM, SUA and D1 have all been split into two axioms reflecting the fact that we first have to fix the DM's preferences on IN T before we can move to comparisons of multi-sets of intervals. EP1, MON1 and EIND on the other hand have been translated directly to the here introduced framework.
Conclusions
We have put forward two frameworks for choice under complete uncertainty. The key ingredient in these frameworks is the assumption that the ordinal utility obtained from an outcome cannot be described by a simple number but is better represented by an interval of utilities. The first framework applied a set-based approach to aggregate utilities from different possible outcomes from the same act while the second framework relied on multi-sets to aggregate uncertain utilities. Then we axiomatically characterized several decision rules for risk-averse boundedly rational DMs in these frameworks.
Our approach is limited by the assumptions we have made. For instance we assumed that there is absolutely no information on the (relative) likelihood of possible outcomes available nor can utilities be cardinally compared.
The further assumption of transitivity of preference relations for decision problems under (complete) uncertainty seems to be in line with human DMs facing such problems. Vrijdags found in [45] that human DMs faced with a choice under complete uncertainty rarely violate transitivity. A related similar result is that of Birnbaum & Schmidt [10] who reported that human DMs display transitive preferences when facing risky choices. The transitivity assumption in our approach hence appears to be in line with real-world human DMs.
Transferring other preference relations (for instance median based relations) to our framework and (axiomatic) investigations of these transferred relations are logical next steps to take. This could yield a better understanding of the frameworks introduced here as well as [the properties of] their preference relations. Furthermore, empirical investigations of choice under complete or imprecise uncertainty (such as [31, 45] ) may be carried out to determine whether decision rules based on our frameworks can lead to better explanations of observed choice behaviour under complete uncertainty (or even to predict such choices).
Appendix A.2. Existing Axiomatic Characterization of classical Min-Max Relation The following axioms were introduced in [4] and [15] . Simple Monotonicity (SM): For all x, y ∈ X such that xP y we have {x} {x, y} {y}. Simple Dominance 1 (SD1): For all x, y, z ∈ X such that xP yP z 7 we have {x, z} {y, z}. Simple Dominance 2 (SD2): For all x, y, z ∈ X such that xP yP z we have {x, y} {x, z}. Simple Uncertainty Aversion (SUA): For all x, y, z ∈ X such that xP yP z we have {y} {x, z}. Simple Uncertainty Appeal (SUP): For all x, y, z ∈ X such that xP yP z we have {x, z} {y}. 
Appendix B. Improved and further Characterizations
It was later found that the axiomatic characterization of the min-max relation given in [15] was erroneous and subsequently a correct characterization was given, see [4] . For this later characterization three new axioms were introduced: SUB, MC and ROB.
Appendix B.1. Improved Characterization of the classical Min-Max Relation
We will here show how to characterize mnx by only slightly modifying one of the axioms in the erroneous proof. Independence' (IND'): For all A, B ∈ K and all x ∈ X such that {x} A B we have A ∪ {x} B ∪ {x}. In Table B .2 the characterizations given in the appendix can be seen at one glance. Unsurprisingly, there is a high degree of symmetry between Table 1  and Table B. 2. 
